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CORPORATIONS AND THE FEDERAL
PROBATION ACT-IS THE COMMUNITY
AN AGGRIEVED PARTY?: UNITED STATES
V. WILLIAM ANDERSON CO.
With the enactment of the Federal Probation Act (the Act),1
Congress granted federal courts statutory authority to suspend the
imposition2 or execution of a criminal defendant's sentence and to
' Federal Probation Act, ch. 521, § 1, 43 Stat. 1259 (1925) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 3651 (1982)). The Act provides, in pertinent part:
Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by
death or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against
the United States when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of
the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the impo-
sition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such pe-
riod and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.
Probation may be granted whether the offense is punishable by a fine or im-
prisonment or both. If an offense is punishable by both fine and imprisonment,
the court may impose a fine and place the defendant on probation as to imprison-
ment. Probation may be limited to one or more counts or indictments, but, in the
absence of express limitation, shall extend to the entire sentence and judgment.
The court may revoke or modify any condition of probation, or may change
the period of probation.
The period of probation, together with any extension thereof, shall not exceed
five years.
While on probation and among the conditions thereof, the defendant-
May be required to pay a fine in one or several sums; and
May be required to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties
for actual damages or loss caused by the offense for which conviction was had; and
May be required to provide for the support of any persons, for whose
support he is legally responsible.
Id.
, A subtle distinction exists between the suspension of the imposition and the suspen-
sion of the execution of a sentence. Justice Black articulated the distinction in Roberts v.
United States, 320 U.S. 264, 268 (1943):
Congress conferred upon the court a choice between imposing sentence before
probation is awarded or after probation is revoked.... The difference in the al-
ternative methods is plain. Under the first, where execution of sentence is sus-
pended, the defendant leaves the court with knowledge that a fixed sentence for a
definite term of imprisonment hangs over him; under the second, he is made
aware that no definite sentence has been imposed and that if his probation is
revoked the court will at that time fix the term of his imprisonment.
Id.; see also G. KILLINGER, H. KEanR & P. CROMWELL, PROBATION AND PAROLE IN THE CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 17-19 (1976).
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grant probation.3 The primary purpose of the Act is to provide
criminals who apparently are capable of rehabilitation time to re-
form when it is clear that actual service of their sentence would
make rehabilitation unlikely.4 The grant of probation is a discre-
tionary act of the trial court' and may be conferred upon both in-
dividuals and corporations.6 A trial judge also has discretion to set
' See Frad v. Kelley, 302 U.S. 312, 315 (1937) ("[t]he act was intended to cure the lack
of power indefinitely to suspend a sentence, under which district courts labored prior to the
enactment"). Prior to 1916, "the district courts exercised a form of probation either by sus-
pending sentence or by placing the defendants under State probation officers or volunteers."
United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 354 (1928) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1377, 68th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 (1925)). These informal practices frequently were resorted to by the United
States courts "since errors occurring in trials and miscarriages of justice could not under the
then-existing system be corrected by granting a new trial or by appeal." See G. KmLINGER,
H. KERPER & P. CROMWELL, supra note 2, at 19.
In 1916, the Supreme Court held that a federal judge was without power to suspend a
sentence indefinitely. Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916). Although the practice
of granting probation had existed in some circuits for 60 years, id. at 50, the Court declined
to uphold the constitutionality of the practice, see id. at 51-52. Indeed, the Court classified
the practice of indefinitely suspending sentences as a "refusal by the judicial power to per-
form a duty resting upon it," id. at 52, and called upon Congress to implement legislation
that would give the federal courts power to suspend the imposition or execution of a sen-
tence, id. Subsequently, two bills were introduced: one in 1917, which was passed by the
House, and one in 1920, which was "never reached for definite action." See United States v.
Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 354 (1928) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1377, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4
(1925)). The Federal Probation Act finally was enacted in 1925. Federal Probation Act, ch.
25, § 1, 43 Stat. 1259 (1925) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982)).
4 See Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932); United States v. Murray, 275
U.S. 347, 357 (1928). In Murray, Chief Justice Taft articulated the justifications for
probation:
The great desideratum was the giving to young and new violators of law a
chance to reform and to escape the contaminating influence of association with
hardened or veteran criminals in the beginning of the imprisonment. Experience
had shown that there was a real locus poenitentiae between the conviction and
certainty of punishment, on the one hand, and the actual imprisonment and pub-
lic disgrace of incarceration and evil association, on the other. . . . Probation was
not sought to shorten the term. Probation is the attempted saving of a man who
has taken one wrong step and whom the judge thinks to be a brand who can be
plucked from the burning at the time of the imposition of the sentence.
275 U.S. at 357-58; see also Best & Birzon, Conditions of Probation: An Analysis, 51 GEO.
L.J. 809, 809 (1963); Note, Judicial Review of Probation Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 181,
181 (1967).
' See, e.g., Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272 (1943); Burns v. United States,
287 U.S. 216, 220-21 (1932); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzales, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir.
1975); Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971); see also Note, supra note 4, at
185-86.
' United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972). Although
corporations only recently have been recognized as eligible for probation, see id., their sub-
jection to criminal liability is firmly established, see New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R.
v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 488 (1909). In New York Central, the Court discounted the
FEDERAL PROBATION ACT
conditions on probation,7 provided such conditions reasonably are
related to the protection of the public and to the rehabilitation of
the defendant.' Notwithstanding a court's broad statutory author-
ity to impose conditions, the Act enumerates five special condi-
tions of probation.e Although a trial judge would not be limited to
selecting among these special conditions, 0 it generally has been
held that if a sentencing judge imposes a condition of probation
that is specified in the Act, the imposed condition is subject to the
limitations recited in the statute."" Recently, however, in United
plaintiff in error's argument that, as a corporation, it was not subject to criminal liability,
stating that there is "no valid objection in law, and every reason in public policy, why the
corporation which profits by the transaction, and can only act through its agents and of-
ficers, shall be held punishable by fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents to
whom it has intrusted authority to act ... ." 212 U.S. at 495; see also United States v.
Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 50, 54-55 (1909) (corporations are capable of wilful breaches of
the law).
7 United States v. Hayward, 471 F.2d 388, 391 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Smith,
414 F.2d 630, 636 (5th Cir. 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schact v. United States,
398 U.S. 58 (1970). Probation conditions are designed to restrict the liberty of the individ-
ual, and are a means by which the court is assured that the convicted defendant will make a
substantial rehabilitative effort. See Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir.
1937). It has been stated that "breach of any of the restrictions may lead to revocation of
the limited grant of freedom and imposition of the more coercive penalty prescribed for the
crime." See Note, supra note 4, at 181. Ideally, the conditions imposed by the trial court
should be fashioned to assist the offender in his rehabilitative effort, but this often is not
the practice. See Best & Birzon, supra note 4, at 810.
8 The "reasonably related" test was judicially formulated in Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d
330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971). The Porth court emphasized the significance of the test by noting
that the goal of probation is to reform the criminal as well as to protect the public. Id.
The Ninth Circuit refined the Porth rationale and constructed a test to aid courts in
determining the constitutionality of a particular probation condition. See United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1975). The Consuelo test requires an exami-
nation of: whether a reasonable relationship exists between the probation conditions and the
purposes sought to be served by granting probation; the extent to which probationers are
entitled to constitutional rights; and the extent to which the condition affects legitimate
needs of law enforcement. Id.; United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d 735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978). The "reasonably related" test also has been enunciated by
the American Bar Association in its Standards Relating to Probation, which provides the
most concise definition of the test: "the conditions must achieve a balance between oppres-
sion and necessity, between interference and utility." STAmARDs RELATNG TO PROBATON §
3.2(b) commentary at 48 (Approved Draft 1970).
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). As a condition of probation, a court may require a de-
fendant to do one or more of the following: pay a fine; "make restitution or reparation to
aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused by the offense"; "provide for the support
of any persons, for whose support he is legally responsible"; participate in a program of a
community treatment center; and participate in a community program. Id.
10 See United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 1982); United
States v. Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 1979).
n1 United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1980); see Karrell v. United
1983]
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States v. William Anderson Co.,12 the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held that although an order of probation may have
been selected from among the special conditions of probation, a
sentencing court is not required to comply with the language quali-
fying that condition. s
In Anderson, corporate defendants were charged with and
convicted of bid-rigging in nine related antitrust prosecutions. 4
The corporations were placed on probation with general and spe-
cial conditions."5 The United States Government challenged the
validity of the probation condition 6 that provided that if certain
installments of fines were paid at the appointed time to a named
charitable institution or community service organization, part of
the fine would be suspended.17 The court of appeals approved the
probation conditions imposed by the district court," and analo-
gized the conditions to those recently utilized by the Ninth Circuit
in United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp.,"9 as well as to those
States, 181 F.2d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950); see also United
States v. Boswell, 565 F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 819 (1978); United
States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962).
12 698 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1982).
13 Id. at 914.
14 Id. at 911.
15 Id. at 912.
Is Id. at 911. The Government did not object to the sentences imposed on the individ-
ual defendants. The sentences "included a brief period of incarceration, performance of
community service work, and payment of fines ranging from $5,000 to $25,000."Id. at 911.
17 Id. at 912 (amount payable to the Government would be reduced by the part sus-
pended after payment to the charity). Other restrictions placed on the corporation included
relinquishment of control over the beneficiary organization's policy or use of the money, and
a prohibition against the taking of a charitable deduction in the corporation's tax return. Id.
Is Id. at 913. The Eighth Circuit stated that the trial court's "sentencing objectives are
in full accord with current penological philosophy and that [the trial judge's] carefully form-
ulated scheme of sentences deserves the praise of being described as 'creative,' innovative,
and imaginative .... ." Id.
19 677 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1982). In Mitsubishi, the defendants pleaded guilty to numer-
ous violations of the Elkins Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41(1) (1976) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 11903, 11905 (1976 & Supp. II 1978)). 677 F.2d at 786. The practices engaged in by the
defendants resulted in special treatment for Mitsubishi on cargoes shipped by rail. Id. The
district court sentenced each corporation to a maximum fine of $20,000 on each of 27
counts. Id. The court suspended these fines and placed the defendant corporations on pro-
bation. Id. The conditions of probation were in compliance with all local, state and federal
laws, and required the loan of a corporate executive to a community program for ex-offend-
ers funded by a corporate payment of $10,000 for each offense. Id. at 737. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, noting that corporate criminal defendants pose a special problem because they
cannot be incarcerated and because their size and access to large amounts of capital enable
them to "just write a check and walk away." Id. at 788.
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employed by other courts in a variety of price-fixing cases.20
The Anderson court noted that the clause in the Act authoriz-
ing a court to create probation conditions "upon such terms and
conditions as the court deems best"21 supported the conditions
chosen by the trial court.22 The Eighth Circuit rejected the Gov-
ernment's argument that a court's power to specify a condition re-
quiring corporate defendants to make a payment of money was
limited by the paragraph in the Act providing that as a condition
of probation the defendant "[m]ay be required to make restitution
or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual damages or loss caused
by the offense for which the conviction was had. '23 The court con-
cluded that the drafters of the Act specified certain terms as in-
cludable among the conditions of probation only to indicate the
"propriety" of the enumerated terms.24
It is submitted that by imposing a fine upon the corporate de-
fendants to be paid to community service groups, the Anderson
court ignored the fundamental differences between a fine and resti-
tution and, more importantly, acted in excess of its statutory au-
thority. Whereas a fine essentially is punitive in nature, restitution
is compensatory.25 It is suggested that by ordering a fine be paid to
community service groups which were not injured by the defen-
20 See United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982). The
court referred to the opinion of Judge Charles Renfrew in the "paper label cases," United
States v. Blankenheim, No. Cr-74-436-CBR (N.D. Cal., filed Nov. 1, 1974) (on file with Yale
Law Journal), and to the opinion of Judge Carl Muecke in the "milk price-fixing case," see
698 F.2d at 913. In the "paper label cases," the executives of the organization convicted of
price fixing were required to make speeches to civic groups on the evils of price fixing, see
Renfrew, The Paper Label Sentences: An Evaluation, 86 YALE L.J. 590, 590 (1977), and in
the "milk price-fixing case," the corporate officers were "requested" to make charitable con-
tributions of milk in lieu of criminal sanctions, see 698 F.2d at 913; Jaffe, Probation With a
Flair: A Look at Some Out-of-the-Ordinary Conditions, 43 FED. PROBATION 25, 34-35
(1979).
21 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
22 United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982). The court
opined that the "deterrent effect of punishment is heightened if it inflicts disgrace and con-
tumely in a dramatic and spectacular manner." Id.
23 Id. at 914 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976 & Supp. H 1978)). The court discounted
the Government's contention that corporations could not be subjected to conditions that
were designed to promote rehabilitative behavior since corporations are legal fictions on
which only payments of money properly may be imposed as a probation condition. 698 F.2d
at 914.
24 698 F.2d at 914. In concluding that the specified terms were not exclusive, the court
stated that "[t]he meaning is the same as if the familiar corporate draftsman's locution
'including but not limited to' had been used." Id.
25 See Best & Birzon, supra note 4, at 821, 826.
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dants' actions, the court, in effect has required the corporate de-
fendants to make restitution to parties not within the contempla-
tion of the Act.
Although the defendant may be required to provide restitution
for his criminal acts,26 a court is limited by the Act to ordering that
such restitution be made only to parties aggrieved by the defend-
ant's crime .27 A clear line of federal case law indicates that the re-
strictions contained in the Act must strictly be adhered to if such
conditions are imposed by federal courts. The first significant judi-
cial interpretation of the enumerated conditions in the Act was
United States v. Follette.25 The Follette court broadened the in-
terpretation of the term "aggrieved parties" to encompass not only
the United States, but all individuals who have suffered direct
financial harm as a result of the criminal acts of the defendant.
29
The Follette definition of "aggrieved parties," which was the foun-
dation of subsequent judicial interpretation of the term,30 was ex-
panded by the Ninth Circuit in Karrell v. United States.1 The
2' See United States v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D. Md. 1981) ("primary
purpose of restitution as a condition of probation is to foster . [the] defendant's ...
responsibility for his or her unlawful actions").
17 See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Boswell, 565
F.2d 1338, 1343 (5th Cir.) (restitution or reparation of losses may be required only for the
amount of actual loss suffered by the victim of the crime), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 819 (1978).
28 32 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Pa. 1940). In Follette, the defendant was indicted for the em-
bezzlement and conversion of $203.99 of United States postal funds. Id. The defendant
pleaded guilty and was placed on probation for 2 years. Id. at 953-54. As a condition of
probation, the court ordered the defendant to reimburse a surety who had paid $466.28 to
the Government. Id. at 954. The defendant, unable to fulfill the condition, petitioned the
court for an extension of the probation term with the same condition. Id. The court, in
granting the extension, held that a trial court was without power to order restitution in an
amount greater than the amount of damages involved in the particular offense for which the
defendant was convicted, and modified its order. Id. at 955.
20 Id.
3' Courts that have addressed the restitution issue in determining probation conditions
invariably have followed the reasoning of Follette. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 679
F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Tiler, 602 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1979); United
States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826 (1952); United States
v. McLaughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 910-12 (D. Md. 1981).
31 181 F.2d 981 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950). Karrell involved probation
conditions placed on a defendant who had engaged in a series of fraudulent home loan
transactions between veterans and the Veteran's Administration. Id. at 983-84. The defend-
ant was convicted on six counts of a 17-count indictment. Id. at 986. The court suspended
the fine and imprisonment and ordered that as a condition of her probation, the defendant
was to make restitution to each of the 17 veterans named in the indictment and to one who
was not represented in the indictment. Id. The circuit court affirmed, but remanded the
case for modification of the probation conditions. Id. at 987.
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Karrell court strictly interpreted the statutory language and lim-
ited a trial court's discretionary power to order restitution pay-
ments,32 holding that such payments can be made only to those
individuals who were damaged or otherwise aggrieved "by the of-
fense for which the conviction was had. '33
The enumerated conditions in the Act also were interpreted
by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Prescon Corp.,34 which,
like Anderson, involved corporate convictions on bid-rigging in-
dictments. 5 In Prescon, the Government appealed from a district
court order granting the corporate defendants probation on the
condition they deposit certain sums with the court, to be disbursed
to community agencies selected by the chief probation officer with
the consent of the court.3 " On appeal, the Government argued that
the Act did not authorize a judge to require a corporation to make
contributions to parties not aggrieved by the corporate crime as an
alternative to the payment of a fine.3 7 The Tenth Circuit re-
versed,38 noting that although the conditions of probation enumer-
32 Id. The Ninth Circuit stated that "[o]ur interpretation of Section 3651 is that Con-
gress intended to restrict the scope of the restitution which could be ordered to the limita-
tion contained in the specific provision. . . ." Id. at 986. The court held that the trial court
erred in ordering restitution for losses sustained by any veterans other than those directly
involved in the crimes for which the defendant had been convicted. Id. at 987.
-3 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976); see 181 F.2d at 987. One basis for the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion was the "familiar rule of statutory interpretation that a specific provision will govern
even though general provisions, if standing alone, would include the same subject." 181 F.2d
at 986-87.
3 695 F.2d 1236 (10th Cir. 1982).
35 Id. at 1238. Prescon and VSL each were charged with one count of bid rigging in
violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982), and two counts of mail
fraud in connection with the submission of rigged bids in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1982). 695 F.2d at 1238. The defendants' actions resulted in fixed, non-competitive price
levels and restraints, and the suppression and elimination of free and open competition. Id.
The mail fraud charges were based on the mailing of rigged bids. Id.
36 695 F.2d at 1238. Prescon and VSL were required to deposit $50,000 and $75,000
respectively. Id. The trial court stated that the fines not only would reimburse the commu-
nity but also would decrease or otherwise affect crime in society. Id. at 1238-39.
" Id. at 1242.
38 Id. The Tenth Circuit based its decision on United States v. Clovis Retail Liquor
Dealers Trade Ass'n, 540 F.2d 1389 (10th Cir. 1976). See 695 F.2d at 1242. In Clovis, the
defendants pleaded nolo contendere to an indictment that charged violations of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act by fixing retail liquor prices. See 540 F.2d at 1389. The trial court im-
posed the maximum fine of $50,000 on each defendant, and sentenced each individual de-
fendant to 1 year in jail. Id. at 1390. The court reduced the sentences of certain individuals
"to imprisonment for six months, [suspending the remainder] to probation for five years on
condition that they pay certain sums as restitution and reparations to the Curry-Roosevelt
County Council on Alcoholism, Inc." Id. (footnote omitted). The execution of the other de-
fendants' sentences was reduced to probation for 5 years provided they too complied with
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ated in the statute are not exclusive, the appropriateness of any
condition that falls into one of the enumerated conditions must be
tested by the limitations contained in the Act."9
The Anderson court, however, interpreted the inclusion of
special conditions of probation in the Act as merely the Legisla-
ture's desire to place the "propriety" of these conditions "beyond
question," and not as a restriction on a court's ability to direct the
payment of funds.40 This statutory analysis is severely undermined
by the observation in Prescon that "[i]t is a familiar rule of statu-
tory interpretation that a specific provision [restitution may be di-
rected only to aggrieved parties] will govern notwithstanding the
fact that a general provision [probation may be granted upon con-
ditions the court "deems best"] ... may include the same subject
matter."4 1 It is submitted, therefore, that if the Anderson court in-
tended to impose restitution as a condition of probation, it should
have required that reparation be made only to the parties ag-
grieved by the defendants' crime, if indeed such parties existed
and were identifiable. It appears that the Eighth Circuit's liberal
interpretation of a court's authority to fashion probation condi-
tions under the Act is gaining increased, if not alarming, accept-
ance in the federal courts.42 Despite the Anderson court's disregard
the probation condition. Id. The net effect of the trial court's sentence was to provide the
Council on Alcoholism with $233,500. Id.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's imposition of community restitution as a
condition of probation because the community group that was to receive payment was not
an "aggrieved party," id., holding that the Act precluded disbursement of funds to those
other than victims of the crime, id.
39 United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1243-44 (10th Cir. 1982); see also
United States v. Vaughn, 636 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Karrell v. United States,
181 F.2d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950) ("where a condition fits
within a category enumerated in the statute,... its appropriateness must be tested by any
limitations expressed in the statute")); see also United States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 187
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962) (the wide latitude given to the district court in
formulating probation conditions is subject to the limitations of the Act).
40 698 F.2d at 914.
4' United States v. Prescon Corp., 695 F.2d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 1982); see also Karrell
v. United States, 181 F.2d 981, 986-87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 891 (1950). The
Karrell court relied on statutory evidence to support its conclusion that the enumerated
conditions contained in the Act were intended by Congress to restrict a court's otherwise
plenary power to impose probation conditions. 181 F.2d at 986-87. The court noted that,
while section 3651 vests the judiciary with broad authority to place a defendant on proba-
tion "for such period . . . as the court deems best," the statute nevertheless specifically
prohibits a probationary period in excess of 5 years. Id. at 986 n.7.
42 See United States v. Wright Contracting Co., 563 F. Supp. 213, 217 (D. Md. 1983);
United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1169-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Nebraska
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for the Act's limitations, the decision is valuable for its recognition
of the difficulties that confront a court in the sentencing of a cor-
poration and of the desirability and effectiveness of imposing resti-
tution as a condition of probation, particularly when a corporate
defendant is involved. 3 The balance of this Comment will explore
the unique problems attendant to the imposition of probation con-
ditions on corporate defendants and the inadequacy of fines as de-
terrents to corporate recidivism. The Comment then will advocate,
as superior to the traditional fine, the viability and effectiveness of
two types of restitution that may be imposed on a criminal corpo-
ration: community service orders and the utilization of what will be
termed a "fluid recovery" type of probation condition.
Bid-Rigger Sentenced to Endow College Ethics Chair, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1983, at Al, col.
6.
In Danilow, six wholesale bakeries convicted of violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act
were fined and placed on probation. 563 F. Supp. at 1164. As a condition of probation, the
defendants were required to donate specified amounts of fresh baked goods to needy and
charitable organizations. Id. at 1164-66. In response to the Government's objection that
under the Act, only the parties aggrieved by the defendants' crime would be proper subjects
of a restitution order, the court stated that requiring the corporate defendants to donate
baked goods to various organizations was an order of community service, "designed prima-
rily to deter future misconduct," and not an order of restitution. Id. at 1169. Nevertheless,
the court acknowledged that the imposed community service order was, in essence, "sym-
bolic restitution." Id. The Danilow court appears to have taken the Anderson construction
of the Act one step further by implying that as long as a court's primary intent in fashion-
ing a community service order is grounded in reasons other than providing redress to ag-
grieved parties, the limitations recited in the special restitution provision of the Act wil not
apply, even if the court's condition of probation virtually is identical to providing reparation
to the community for the corporation's criminal acts. See id. at 1170. It is submitted that
the Danilow court indulged in a semantic sidestepping of the restrictions placed on a federal
court's power to construct probation conditions-a probation condition that is, in essence,
restitution, cannot be transfigured simply by judicial assignment of a new appellation such
as community service.
Paralleling the decision in Danilow, the Wright court also granted probation to a con-
victed corporate defendant on the condition that $175,000 be paid to a specified charitable
organization which, by the court's admission, had "no reasonable factual nexus to the spe-
cific offense defendant pled guilty to." 563 F. Supp. at 214. The court reasoned that since
the purpose of the probation condition was to punish and deter, the restrictive language of
the Act's restitution provision was not applicable. Id. It is submitted that the courts must
look behind the name or form of any probation condition imposed to determine the condi-
tion's actual substance and effect.
43 Judge Dumbauld, writing for the Eighth Circuit in Anderson, was aware of the pecu-
liar difficulties that convicted corporations pose to sentencing courts. 698 F.2d at 914. Judge
Dumbauld asserted that an effective means of handling a criminally convicted legal
fiction-the corporate defendant-was to impose rehabilitative measures that would affect
the decisionmaking process of those individuals responsible for the policies and decisions of
the corporation. See id.
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SENTENCING THE CRIMINAL CORPORATION
When corporate defendants are placed on probation, courts
encounter difficulties that rarely arise in the sentencing of individ-
uals. The corporation's status as a legal entity precludes the use
and threat of the traditional criminal punishment of incarcera-
tion.44 Thus, courts and legislatures, in attempting to sanction the
criminal corporation, have utilized fines45 and have vested private
plaintiffs with the right to maintain treble damage actions. 4 These
44 See United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1982); Note,
Increasing Community Control over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions,
71 YALE L.J. 280, 282 (1961) (punishment cannot meaningfully be imposed on a legal form).
State punishment of criminals was the outgrowth of private retaliation efforts against the
criminal actor. See WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 2, at 7-8 (C. Torcia 14th ed. 1978). Some
commentators posit that criminal sanctions remain primarily retributive in nature. See id.
at 8-9; see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 308 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("retri-
bution is part of the nature of man and [utilizing] that instinct in the administration of
criminal justice serves an important purpose in promoting the stability of a society governed
by law"). The use of imprisonment as a deterrent to individual criminal conduct is well
established. The Supreme Court articulated this view in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822
(1974):
An important function of the corrections system is the deterrence of crime.
The premise is that by confining criminal offenders in a facility where they are
isolated from the rest of society, a condition that most people presumably find
undesirable, they and others will be deterred from committing additional criminal
offenses.
Id.
45 See, e.g., United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 127 (1958) (conviction
of the corporate entity leads only to a fine levied on the corporate assets); United States v.
Hougland Barge Line, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 1110, 1114 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (statute calling for
imprisonment is applicable to a corporate defendant, but only to the extent that it is re-
quired to pay the fine portion of the penalty); Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)
(any person monopolizing or conspiring to monopolize shall be deemed guilty of a felony
and subject to a fine not exceeding $1,000,000); Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-2(b)(1)(A) (Supp. I 1977) (domestic corporation attempting to influence foreign offi-
cials or political parties shall be fined not more than $1,000,000); Note, supra note 44, at
284-87.
46 See, e.g., Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d 659, 667 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 503
F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1974) (the principle purposes of the treble damage provision in 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 are to deter antitrust violations, to provide incentive to private plaintiffs, and to sup-
plement Government law enforcement), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Pollock & Riley,
Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1242-43 (5th Cir. 1974) (deterrence of violations),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992 (1975); E. TIMBERLAKE, FEDERAL TREBLE DAMAGE ANTITRUST Ac-
TIONS § 3.01, at 11 (1965) (action granted to the private litigant to deter other violations and
to supplement the Department of Justice in enforcing the antitrust laws); Note, Private
Treble Damage Antitrust Suits: Measure of Damages for Destruction of All or Part of a
Business, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1566, 1566-67 (1967) (essential purposes are to deter violations,
to encourage litigation, and to augment the lenient criminal remedies available to the Gov-
ernment); Note, supra note 44, at 284, 288-90.
19831 FEDERAL PROBATION ACT
sanctions, however, have proven ineffective both as deterrents to
criminal conduct and as a means of punishing the convicted corpo-
ration.47 As a result, corporate criminal activity and recidivism
have increased dramatically in recent years. 48 It is suggested that
47 There is agreement among commentators that the current use of fines as sanctions
against corporations is entirely inadequate. See Coffee, "No Soul to Damn: No Body to
Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 386, 407 (1981); Note, Structural Crime and Institutional Rehabilitation: A New Ap-
proach to Corporate Sentencing, 89 YALE L.J. 353, 360 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Struc-
tural Crime]; Note, supra note 44, at 285, 287.
One commentator has discounted the effectiveness of the treble damage suit as a means
of deterring corporate criminal behavior in antitrust cases. See Note, supra note 44, at 289.
The author indicates that since the success of plaintiffs in such actions is marginal, corpo-
rate policy rarely is reformulated in reaction to such suits. Id.
Ironically, the most effective means of reformulating corporate policy-punishment of
the guilty corporate official-has been the most difficult to implement. The inherent organi-
zational complexity of large corporations impedes identification and thus the conviction of
the responsible parties. See Structural Crime, supra, at 358. Corporate structural complex-
ity has been identified as the primary obstacle to individual prosecutions. See Comment,
Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Illegality, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 40, 48-49 (1978).
The policy formulator is, therefore, apparently able to act with anonymity and without fear
of criminal prosecution. See Structural Crime, supra, at 358.
An additional obstacle to the conviction of a corporate policymaker is the reluctance on
the part of juries to convict the individual corporate official notwithstanding the fact that
liability may be readily apparent. Jurors tend to separate the conduct of the managing offi-
cials from the criminal activity of the corporation. See Comment, supra, at 49. Indeed, ju-
ries have acquitted corporate officials when criminal liability was undeniable. See United
States v. American Stevedores, Inc., 310 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
969 (1963) (tax evasion); Magnolia Motor & Logging Co. v. United States, 264 F.2d 950, 953-
54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 815 (1959) (conversion of government property). Several
reasons have been posited by commentators for this general reluctance to convict the culpa-
ble corporate manager. Professor Sanford Kadish notes that crimes committed by corpora-
tions lack the moral reprehensibility that accompanies crimes committed by individuals. See
Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Reg-
ulations, 30 U. Cm. L. REV. 423, 425-26 (1963). The trier of fact often empathizes with the
corporate official, judging him to be a person of high socio-economic status who would be
unlikely to engage in criminal behavior. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME
288-89 (1980); Friedman, Some Reflections on the Corporation as Criminal Defendant, 55
NoTEE DAMsE LAW. 173, 179 (1979); See Comment, supra, at 42-43, 49.
48 See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 47, at 112-23. Recidivism is common
among corporate offenders. Indeed, the defendant in United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,
465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972), was charged with an offense for which it previously had been
convicted. Id. at 59; see C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS-THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPO-
RATE BEHAVIOR 184 (1975); E. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 25 (1961). Sutherland
notes that 60% of the 70 largest corporations have an average of four convictions each, E.
SUTHERLAND, supra, at 25, asserting that most corporations engage in illegal restraints of
trade and that 50-75% of them do it with sufficient regularity to be classified "habitual
criminals," id. at 61. Professor Posner indicates that 46 of the 320 largest corporations con-
victed of antitrust violations between 1964 and 1968 previously had been convicted. See
Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. L. & ECON. 365, 394-95 (1970).
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courts should impose probation conditions that will deter corpora-
tions from committing crimes and which concomitantly will permit
those corporations to function effectively as profitmaking or-
ganizations.49
In constructing probation conditions, courts must take into ac-
count the requirement that any condition imposed must satisfy the
dual purposes of probation: rehabilitation of the defendant and
protection of society. 0 Indeed, the Act expressly provides that
"when satisfied that the . . . best interest of the public as well as
the defendant will be served. . .[courts] may. .. [place] the de-
fendant. . . upon such terms and conditions [of probation] as...
deem[ed] best." 51 In light of the shortcomings inherent in the im-
position of fines as conditions of probation, it is suggested that
courts should refrain from imposing probation conditions which ei-
ther are not "reasonably related" to the crime charged 52 or are so
burdensome that the corporation, in an effort to compensate for
lost profits, increases the prices of its products or services, thereby
49 The viability of using probation as an effective deterrent mechanism has been recog-
nized by several commentators. See Orland, Reflections on Corporate Crime: Law in Search
of Theory and Scholarship, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 501, 517 (1980); Structural Crime, supra
note 47, at 364-65; Recent Developments, Criminal Law-The Application of the Federal
Probation Act to the Corporate Entity: United States v. Atlantic Richfield, 465 F.2d 58
(1972), 3 U. BALT. L. R-v. 294, 301 (1974). Professor Orland characterizes probation for
corporations as:
[A] promising but massively underutilized sanction in corporate crime cases. Gen-
erally, corporate executives seek probation as a palatable alternative to prison,
while corporations seek to avoid probation since it is a potentially powerful reme-
dial device and, as such, far more threatening than a fine. For example, corpora-
tions can be ordered not to violate the criminal law, or to make restitution for
harm caused by the criminal act. Thus, a probation order can become the instru-
ment for prevention of future crime or redress of past harm. Yet judges are reluc-
tant to impose probation on corporations and only a few courts have attempted to
thrust probation on unwilling corporate defendants. As a result, the deterrent and
rehabilitative potential for corporate probation has yet to be realized.
Orland, supra, at 517 (footnotes omitted).
50 The ideals of rehabilitation and protection are fundamental to probation. One court
has noted that:
[t]he only limitation [to the discretionary power of the trial court in formulating
conditions] is that the conditions have a reasonable relationship to the treatment
of the accused and the protection of the public. The object. . .is to produce a law
abiding citizen and at the same time to protect the public against continued crimi-
nal or antisocial behavior.
Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330, 333 (10th Cir. 1971); see also United States v. Consuelo-
Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1975).
18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
8' See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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shifting the burden of the criminal penalty to the innocent con-
sumer. Instead, courts should consider imposing the probation con-
ditions described in the balance of this Comment, which meet the
goals of restitution without the burdensome side effects of tradi-
tional sanctions."
ALTERNATIVE TYPES OF RESTITUTION
Community Service
Community service has been recognized by criminal law schol-
ars as an effective sanction against the convicted individual de-
fendant.5 4 Several states provide for the imposition of community
83 See Coffee, supra note 47, at 402. Professor Coffee has noted that trial courts must
recognize that the sentences they impose may affect not only the individual defendant but
also society in general. Id. at 401-02. Coffee warns of remedies that are "worse than the
disease... which they were meant to cure." Id. at 403-04. This reasoning is applicable to
probation conditions as well. Indeed, a court may impose a fine as a condition of probation
equal to the fine imposed for the violation. See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465
F.2d 58, 61 (7th Cir. 1972) (conditions imposed by the court may not exceed the maximum
penalty authorized by Congress). For example, since the maximum fine that may be as-
sessed against a corporation for an antitrust violation may not exceed $1,000,000, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1982), the possibility of oppressive probation conditions becomes apparent when a cor-
porate violator is convicted in a multi-count indictment. If a multimillion dollar criminal
penalty were levied as a probation condition, corporations with limited amounts of capital
may be forced to lay off employees or perhaps to go out of business. See United States v.
Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Such a result, it is submitted,
would frustrate the objective of the protection of society.
The reluctance of courts to enforce onerous or vague probation conditions was evident
in United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 465 F.2d 58 (7th Cir. 1972). In Atlantic Richfield,
a corporation was convicted of violating the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30
Stat. 1152 (1899) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411 (1976)), which prohibits the
discharge of refuse into navigable waters. 465 F.2d at 59. As a condition of probation, the
corporation was required to devise a program to control oil spillage that polluted both land
and stream. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the trial court's probation condition on the
ground that the condition imposed unreasonable standards upon the probationer, since the
corporation would not know when the condition was satisfied. Id. at 61. Thus, the probation
conditions were deemed contrary to the purposes of the statute and the case was remanded
for imposition of a condition within the statute's limits. Id.; see also Higdon v. United
States, 627 F.2d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 1980) (unnecessarily harsh probation conditions are
impermissible).
" See, e.g., Fisse, Community Service as a Sanction Against Corporations, 1981 Wis.
L. REv. 970, 1001-08; Harland, Court-Ordered Community Service in Criminal Law: The
Continuing Tyranny of Benevolence?, 29 BuFPALo L. Pav. 425, 425-31 (1980). Fisse asserts
that although community service is a viable sanction against individuals, it is an inappropri-
ate probation condition for corporations, see Fisse, supra, at 971-72, and distinguishes com-
munity service imposed as a sentence from community service imposed as a probation con-
dition, id. at 971. Fisse asserts that when community service is ordered as a sentence, the
policies of deterrence and retribution are attained; when imposed as a condition of proba-
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service on individuals convicted of misdemeanors or felonies. 55
Notwithstanding the recognized utility of community service as a
punitive sanction and as a probation condition for individual of-
fenders,56 this form of probation condition rarely has been ordered
by courts as a condition of corporate probation.5 7 Necessarily, an
order of community service as a probation condition would be sub-
ject to the "reasonably related" test 5s and, therefore, the services
rendered by the corporation would have to provide reparation to
the segment of society whose rights were infringed on by the cor-
poration's crime.59 The criminal corporation would be obligated to
perform the probation order or suffer reinstatement of the original
tion, a court's primary concern is rehabilitation. Id. at 971-72. It is submitted that this dis-
tinction is inaccurate, since deterring future corporate criminal conduct is inherent in the
imposition of a corporate probation condition. See supra note 49.
5 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.055(a) (1980) (court may order community work in
addition to any fine or restitution ordered as a condition of a suspended sentence); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 490.5(d) (West Supp. 1983) (community service appropriate when used in lieu
of fines ranging from $50 to $1,000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4105(a), (b) (Supp. 1982)
(authorizing community service in lieu of fines or costs if defendant is unable to pay); N.Y.
PENAL LAw § 65.10(2)(h) (McKinney Supp. 1982) (court may impose community service as
probation condition for conviction of offense, violation, misdemeanor, or class D or E fel-
ony); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 991a(A)(1)(c) (West Supp. 1983) (at time of sentencing or
at time during a suspended sentence court may order defendant to perform community ser-
vice without compensation except in cases of third or subsequent felonies).
" See, e.g., United States v. Restor, 679 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1982); Higdon v. United
States, 627 F.2d 893, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Arthur, 602 F.2d 660, 664
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979).
:7 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. For a discussion of unreported imposi-
tions of community service upon individuals and corporations in the federal courts, see
Jaffe, supra note 20, at 34.
5 United States v. Restor, 679 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1982); Higdon v. United States,
627 F.2d 893, 899-900 (9th Cir. 1980); see supra note 82. The Higdon court noted that com-
munity service, when imposed as a probation condition, satisfied the Consuelo-Gonzalez
"reasonably related" test. 627 F.2d at 899 & n.14. The court stated that, when considering
the imposition of community service as a probation condition, a court must evaluate the
offender's physical, psychological, and financial condition and must not order a work sched-
ule that significantly reduces time for paid employment or that substantially interferes with
the maintenance of a normal family life. Id. at 899. It is suggested that when considering the
imposition of community service upon a corporation, courts should entertain analogous con-
siderations. The community service order should not drain the corporation of necessary cap-
ital or employee services to such an extent that the profit-making activities of that corpora-
tion will be curtailed unreasonably.
" New Hampshire expressly has provided that community service orders shall be re-
parative to the community for the interest that was adversely affected. See N.H. Rxv. STAT.
ANN. § 651:2 (Supp. 1981) (nature of the community service imposed must be that which, in
the judgment of the court, fosters respect for the interests violated by the defendant's con-
duct); Harland, supra note 54, at 432-39.
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sentence.60 The corporation, therefore, could be required to engage
in socially advantageous acts throughout the maximum 5-year lim-
itation period expressed in the Act.61 A community service order
would serve a dual purpose: it would benefit society during the
probation period and would deter recidivism.6 2
Community service also would be an effective means of pro-
viding notice to the community whose interests had been damaged
and would invite scrutiny from the general public. Indeed, commu-
nity service may be valuable as a deterrent to future corporate
crime since the publicity accompanying the community service
would tend to detract from a business' goodwill, which is a valua-
ble corporate asset. 3 The probation order would thus create public
60 See United States v. Rifen, 634 F.2d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Johns, 625 F.2d 1175, 1176 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. McLeod, 608 F.2d 1076, 1078
(5th Cir. 1979). Occasionally, a corporation may prefer to accept the original sentence rather
than perform the community service order, particularly when such performance would de-
tract from the corporation's public image. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
61 See 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982). The period of probation imposed on the corporation
necessarily would be restricted by the 5-year limitation specified in the statute. See United
States v. Workman, 617 F.2d 48, 50 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Nunez, 573 F.2d 769,
771 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 930 (1978). It is submitted that this 5-year period will
allow the probationer sufficient time to make reparation to the community for the offense
committed.
62 See Fisse, supra note 54, at 995. Professor Fisse notes that when imposed as a sanc-
tion, the "community service order ... require[s] the company to initiate and actively par-
ticipate in a socially useful project extending over a number of years, thereby bringing pun-
ishment home to the company in a manner calculated to have a continuing deterrent effect."
Id. Former Chief Judge Brown of the district court in Memphis, Tennessee summarized the
value of community service as a probation condition:
(1) [Requiring] the probationer... to do work without pay for good cause should
have some therapeutic effect since [it]... would make him atone for his misdeed
in a concrete and constructive way ....
(2) The involved public and charitable agencies would receive valuable services
from the probationer which they very much need ....
(3) The imposition of work without pay would make probation more acceptable to
the public in that the public would be more likely to feel that justice had been
done ....
(4) [T]he probationer would work for a designated agency which would in turn be
in touch with his probation officer [allowing] the officer to have an additional han-
de on the probationer.
Brown, Community Service as a Condition of Probation, 41 FED. PROBAnON 7, 7 (1977).
63 See Fisse, The Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against Business Corpora-
tions, 8 MuB. U.L. Rav. 107, 127 (1971) (corporate image is a "composite of knowledge,
feelings, ideas and beliefs" possessed by the community with respect to a company as a
result of the totality of its activities). The use of publicity as a sanction against the criminal
corporation has been advocated by several commentators. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER,
supra note 47, at 318-22; Fisse, supra, at 144-50; see also United States v. William Anderson
Co., 698 F.2d 911, 913 (8th Cir. 1982) ("painful publicity is not relished by corporate ty-
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awareness of the gravity of the crime and of the culpability of the
corporation and its managing officers." Moreover, it is suggested,
notice to society will foster modification of internal corporate pol-
icy. Such modification may be accomplished by requiring that
when the community service order calls for individual services,
such services must be performed by those officers and directors re-
sponsible for the formulation of the illegal corporate policy.65 It is
coons"). Clinard and Yeager suggest that publicity may be useful as a control of corporate
criminal activity, not only because of its deterrent effect but also because publicity may
warn consumers about deceptive advertising, defective products, and consumer fraud prac-
tices. See M. CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 47, at 319.
'4 Publicity currently is used as a sanction against violators of the Food and Drug Act,
21 U.S.C. § 375(a) (1976). Such public notification has been determined to be an effective
deterrent to subsequent corporate criminality. See Comment, supra note 47, at 52. The
practice of notifying those affected by the crime for the purpose of deterring subsequent
criminal conduct also is pervasive in the labor arena. Id. An employer found guilty of unfair
labor practices must "publicize" his crime to his employees by posting the order of the
Labor Relations Board and mailing a copy of it to individual employees. Id. The order has
the effect of impressing upon the employee the seriousness of the employer's offense. Id.;
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 304 (2d Cir.) (posting remedies the coercive
practices engaged in by the corporation), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005 (1967).
Several commentators have stated that ordering a corporation to perform community
service may not foster a general public awareness of the crime, since the general public is
unable to understand the complexity of the corporation's illegal activity. See, e.g., M.
CLINARD & P. YEAGER, supra note 47, at 321. It is suggested that publicity surrounding a
corporation's conviction of industrial crimes would be of less interest to the general public
than a report of corporate crime in the retail sector, and thus would fail to create the crimi-
nal stigma necessary to deter future crimes by the corporation. It is essential, therefore, that
in addition to the aggrieved community in general, the community service be performed for
that segment of the aggrieved society which best would understand the criminal activity.
Those who comprehend the crime, "the opinion leaders," would then be able to disseminate
this information to the general public. See Fisse, supra note 63, at 144.
There may be some concern that the criminal corporation performing community ser-
vices would use the opportunity to foster its self-interest by publicly minimizing its involve-
ment in the criminal activity. One commentator has suggested that the corporation might
engage in "counter publicity" through affirmative advertising efforts discounting the crimi-
nality of the corporation's actions. See Fisse, supra note 63, at 135. A counterpublicity cam-
paign would require a substantial capital investment to rebut the unfavorable image created
by the publicity accompanying the community service order. Id. at 138-39. As a result, there
would be a twofold drawing upon the capital reserves of the corporation for a single criminal
offense: the performance of the community service order and the counterpublicity campaign.
It is suggested that the potential increased capital disbursement necessary to stage such a
counterpublicity campaign will provide additional deterrence to corporate recidivism. In ad-
dition, since the probationer is subject to the supervision of a probation officer, see Note,
supra note 4, at i81, an effort by the corporation to subvert the community service order
and manipulate it into a self-aggrandizing tactic will warrant notification to the court, revo-
cation of the probationary status, and the imposition of the original sentence, id.
" See United States v. Mitsubishi Int'l Corp., 677 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1982). In
Mitsubishi, the court imposed a probation condition requiring the corporations to provide a
company executive to the National Alliance for Business for development of a community
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suggested that the imposition of a community service order is more
appropriate when a court is attempting to redress injuries suffered
by a small number of individuals. When the crime committed by
the corporation is one affecting a large sector of the community at
large, however, as when consumers are injured, it is suggested that
courts impose the probation condition that closely resembles the
relief occasionally granted in consumer class actions-fluid
recovery.
Fluid Recovery
Directing restitution to the section of society injured by corpo-
rate crime can be a viable probation condition provided the requi-
site elements of aggrieved-party status are present: sufficient iden-
tification66 and ascertainable damages. 7 Within these confines,
courts may construct probation conditions requiring a corporation
to distribute to the aggrieved sector of society the damages as-
sessed for the injury. It is suggested that courts should utilize the
concept of fluid recovery to effectuate this distribution. Fluid re-
covery is a remedy generally employed in civil class actions that
effects the compensation of an entire class of litigants by requiring
the defendant to reduce the cost of its product or service-the sub-
action program. Id.
By becoming the means through which the corporation must perform its community
service, the corporate official may fall into an unfavorable light among his peers. See Coffee,
supra note 47, at 433. Coffee notes that the individual director might lose the respect of his
fellow business associates, a loss that can be an effective deterrent for the middle class of-
fender. Id.; see also Renfrew, supra note 20, at 594 (embarrassment attached to perform-
ance of community service work provides deterrent for corporate officers and directors to
avoid future corporate wrongdoing).
66 See United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hoff-
man, 415 F.2d 14, 22-23 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969). In Roberts, the defend-
ant was convicted on fifty counts of mail fraud, sentenced to imprisonment on counts one
through forty-nine and placed on probation for 5 years on count fifty. 619 F.2d at 1-2. One
of the conditions imposed on the defendant was that he make restitution of $750,000. Id. at
2. Roberts claimed that the restitution order was unauthorized because the aggrieved class
was not sufficiently identified so as to comport with the limits of the statute. Id. The court
disagreed, noting that 34,135 names and addresses of aggrieved consumers had been estab-
lished, representing approximately two-thirds of those harmed by the defendant. Id. Ac-
cordingly, the court held there was sufficient identification of consumers so that attempts
could be made to contact the remainder of those not yet identified. Id.
67 A probation order is inoperative if made for an undetermined sum. See United
States v. Hoffman, 415 F.2d 14, 21 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 958 (1969); United
States v. Taylor, 305 F.2d 183, 187 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 894 (1962); United
States v. Stoehr, 196 F.2d 276, 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826 (1952).
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ject of the class action-for a specified period of time. 8 Compensa-
tion is distributed to the class as a whole in the form of reduced
prices, since the injury suffered by an individual consumer who has
purchased the product of a defendant adjudged guilty of price-
fixing or misrepresentation usually is not substantial enough to
prompt litigation. 9 The aggrieved sector of society, therefore, re-
covers its damages through a continued use of the product or ser-
vice. It is suggested that the concept of fluid recovery can be uti-
lized by sentencing courts when the defendant corporation's
See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917
(1982); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d
1005, 1018 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1973); Note,
The Cy Pres Solution to the Damage Distribution Problems of Mass Class Actions, 9 GA. L.
REv. 893, 894 n.10 (1975) (fluid recovery effectuates compensation by returning damages to
consumers currently using defendant's products or services).
The seminal case involving the adjudication of fluid recovery as a damage distribution
mechanism is Eisen. See Comment, Due Process and Fluid Class Recovery, 53 OR. L. REv.
225, 229 & n.20 (1974). Eisen involved an allegation of monopolization and price fixing of
odd lot stock trading over a period of 4 years in violation of the antitrust laws, 52 F.R.D. at
256-58, and presented the issue of whether a large class action could be maintained under
revised rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, id. at 256. Eisen, an investor, sought
to represent himself and similarly situated investors who had traded with Carlisle & Jacque-
lin and DeCoppet & Demorus, which were investment houses on the New York Stock Ex-
change, id. at 257, and represented a class of approximately six million traders of odd lots,
and sought to recover between 20 and 60 million dollars, id. at 265. Judge Tyler observed
that the situation presented an appropriate opportunity to exercise a fluid recovery distribu-
tion process. Id. at 264-65. On appeal, however, the fluid class recovery explicitly was re-
jected by the Second Circuit. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir.'
1973), vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). The court concluded that the magnitude
of the class Eisen represented was unmanageable. Id. at 1018. The United States Supreme
Court held that the plaintiff was obligated to notify those individuals who were easily ascer-
tainable, 417 U.S. at 174, and required the plaintiff to bear the cost of financing the suit, id.
at 178-79. The Court, however, did not address the appropriateness of the fluid recovery
process, stating: "We therefore have no occasion to consider whether the Court of Appeals
correctly resolved the issues of manageability and fluid-class recovery, or indeed, whether
those issues were properly before the court. . . ." Id. at 172 n.10. Although the constitu-
tionality of the fluid recovery was rejected by the Second Circuit, the remedy remains a
viable distribution process. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit recently noted the variances among
the circuits in the class-wide assessment and calculation of damages. See In re Federal
Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 342 (1982). The court
noted that the "propriety of class-wide damage assessment, with or without a fluid recovery
mechanism, should depend on whether it is consistent with the policies of the underlying
cause of action." Id. The Second Circuit's opinion in Eisen has been criticized as "repre-
senting a mechanical and unsympathetic reading of Rule 23 and one that completely ignores
the courts' discretion to fashion relief." See 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTIcE
AND PROCEDURE § 1784, at 110 (Supp. 1983) (footnote omitted).
69 See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675 (7th Cir. 1981); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52
F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973); Comment, Damage
Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CHI. L. REv. 448, 460 (1972).
FEDERAL PROBATION ACT
criminal acts have resulted in increased prices for the individual
consumer. The prices of the defendant's products or services could
be lowered in an amount and for a period of time which, in the
judgment of the court, would accomplish the redress of the ag-
grieved consumers."0
CONCLUSION
Federal courts are vested with broad authority to fashion pro-
bation conditions to aid in a criminal defendant's rehabilitation
and in the protection of society. Nevertheless, since this authority
is purely statutory, the judiciary must respect any limitations the
Legislature has deemed fit to impose on the courts' otherwise ple-
nary power. The Anderson decision marks a departure from the
well-settled principle that any order of probation conditioned on
restitution must be directed to those aggrieved by the defendant's
crime. Although the Eighth Circuit directed that the corporate de-
fendants make payments to charitable organizations having no log-
ical relationship to the defendants' antitrust violations, the deci-
sion brings attention to the difficulty of sentencing an entity for
which incarceration is an impossibility. This Comment has sug-
gested that as an alternative to the traditional and ineffective fine,
courts require corporate defendants to redress the victims of their
crimes through community service and a fluid recovery form of res-
titution. These conditions of probation can be constructed to effect
restitution to the aggrieved parties and the rehabilitation of corpo-
rate defendants, while at the same time conforming to the restric-
tions of the Federal Probation Act.
Timothy G. Griffin
70 See United States v. Danilow Pastry Co., 563 F. Supp. 1159, 1169 n.20 (S.D.N.Y.
1983). As a condition of probation, the Danilow court required six corporate defendants to
donate baked goods, the subject of the defendants' price fixing, to charitable organizations.
Id. at 1167. The court considered the donations to New York charitable organizations to
have met the requirements in the Act that restitution be made only to aggrieved parties. Id.
It is submitted that the court's basic concept and acceptance of fluid recovery restitution is
laudatory, and that this judicial approach to restitution should be continued, with the ca-
veat that courts must ensure that those benefiting by a reduction in the price of a defend-
ant's products in fact represent that group of consumers aggrieved by the corporate crime.
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